Michigan Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 2

1939

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - INDEBTEDNESS - USE OF
MANDAMUS TO COMPEL PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT
John L. Rubsam
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John L. Rubsam, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - INDEBTEDNESS - USE OF MANDAMUS TO COMPEL
PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT, 38 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1939).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/23

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1939]

RECENT DECISIONS
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - INDEBTEDNESS - UsE OF MANDAMUS TO
CoMPEL PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT - Petitioner sought a peremptory order
directed to the council of the city of Long Beach, to compel them to include in
the I 939 budget a sum sufficient to pay a judgment obtained for materials
furnished to the city. Held, the denial of application by the lower court was not
an abuse of discretion, since payment of the judgment would have given the
petitioner a preference over other creditors of the same class inasmuch as there
were insufficient funds available to pay all claims of such class without crippling
the city or working unusual hardship on tru.-payers. Coombs v. Edwards, 280
N. Y. 361, 21 N. E. (2d) 353 (1939).
The property of citizens and taxpayers of a municipal corporation cannot
be taken to satisfy a judgment against the municipality,1 except in some of the
New England states, where the unsatisfied creditor may levy execution of his
judgment on the property of a private citizen within the municipality.2 Usually
the only method of obtaining satisfaction is by mandamus to require payment or
to compel the levy of a tax therefor. 8 Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy
which is largely controlled by equitable principles. 4 Although payment of the
judgment is a legal right, the application for the order is addressed to the discretion of the court. An order of mandamus under the New York practice takes
the place of the old writ of mandamus. It is a legal remedy, but issuance of the
order, like that of the writ it superseded, is controlled largely by equitable principles.11 It therefore lies within the discretion of the court; and even where the
applicant presents a clear legal right, still the court may determine whether, in

People ex rel. Thorne v. San Francisco, 4 Cal. 127 (1854).
Hawkes v. Kennebeck, 7 Mass. 461 (1811); Chase v. Merrimack Bank, 19
Pick. (36 Mass.) 564 (1837); Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 (1877); Beardsley
v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368 (1844); Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212 (1885); 4 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 5th ed., 2673 (19n).
8 Whigham v. Gulf Refining Co., 20 Ga. App. 427, 93 S. E. 238 (1917);
Herter v. Detroit, 243 Mich. 66, 219 N. W. 617 (1929).
'Duncan Townsite Co. v. Tane, 245 U.S. 308, 38 S. Ct. 99 (1917).
11 Warehousemen's Assn. of Port of New York v. Cosgrove, 241 N. Y. 580, 150
N. E. 563 (1925).
1
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the exercise of sound discretion, it shall grant or withhold the order. 6 While
ordinarily mandamus will lie to compel the proper municipal authorities to levy
and assess taxes for payment of a judgment against the city, the extent of this
power to tax is limited by the provisions of the constitution and statutes, and only
the surplus of the revenues over and above the amount necessary for the operation and conduct of the city government can be applied for this purpose.1 The
general rule requires that the creditor reduce his claim to judgment before he
may avail himself of the remedy of a mandamus. 8 In granting the writ, the
courts reserve the right to order payment by the municipal corporation spread
over a short period of years when it is considered advisable.9 The applicant has
the burden of demonstrating the necessity and the propriety of the use of mandamus, ano it will not be granted where to do so would subject the city to
financial difficulties. 10 In the present case the remedy would have worked an
unusual hardship upon the taxpayers of this small city and in addition would
have given this petitioner a preference over the other creditors. The taxpayers
were already subject to a ta"{ rate of a little over four dollars per one thousand
dollars of assessed valuation. There were not sufficient funds available at this
time to pay all the floating indebtedness without crippling the city. It therefore
seems that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to issue the
order.
John L. Rubsam
6
Matter of Durr v. Paragon Trading Corp., 270 N. Y. 464, 1 N. E. (2d) 967
(1937); 6 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 2d rev. ed., § 2664 at p. 722
(1937).
.
7
Clarendon v. Betts, (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 174 S. W. 958; United Taxpayers
Co. v. San Francisco, 202 Cal. 264, 259 P. 1101 (1927); Daly v. Melvindale, 271
Mich. 431, 260 N. W. 898 (1935); Herter v. City of Detroit, 243 Mich. 66, 219
-N. W. 617 (1928); Donner-Hanna Coke Corp. v. Eberhardt, 156 Misc. 41, 280
N. Y. S. 607 (1936); Kelly v. City of Yonkers, 242 App. Div. 798, 274 N. Y. S.
78 I ( I 934) ( execution against city's property under judgment which city failed to
include in tax budget held authorized by statute).
8
People ex rel. Lawrence v. Clark County, 50 Ill. 213 (1869); State ex rel.
Little v. Township Committee, 37 N. J. L. 84 (1874). In many states, however,
mandamus will lie for liquidated claims without an existing judgment. J. B. McCrary
,Co. v. Brunson, 204 Ala. 85, 85 So. 396 (1920); Shinbone v. Randolph County, 56
Ala. 183 (1876). The rule is different, however, in the courts of the United States,
where such a writ can only be granted in aid of an existing jurisdiction, the mandamus being in the nature of an execution to carry the judgment into effect. County
of Greene v. Daniel, 102 U.S. 187 (1880).
9
East St. Louis v. Amy, 120 U. S. 600, 7 S. Ct. 739 (1887); City of Cleveland
v. United States, (C. C. A. 6th, 1909) 166 F. 677; Perry v. Town of Samson, (D. C.
Ala. 1926) II F. (2d) 655.
1 ° County of Nassau v. City of Long Beach, 272 N. Y. 260, 5 N. E. (2d) 8II
(1937); East St. Louis v. Amy, 120 U. S. 600, 7 S. Ct. 739 (1887); 4 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 5th ed., 2675 (1911); Morris, Mather & Co. v. Port of
Astoria, 141 Ore. 251, 15 P. (2d) 385 (1932) (where the court held that if cash on
hand is insufficient to pay holders of bonds of municipality they should share pro rata
under the rule that equality is equity); 12 ORE. L. REv. 164 (1933). But see State
ex rel. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Curry, 104 Fla. 242, 139 So. 891 (1932), where it
was held that the writ is employed as an execution on a judgment and takes priority
in order of its service.

